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What is This?
Labour migration, social incorporation and transmigration in the New Europe. The case of Germany in a comparative perspective

Ludger Pries*

Summary
This article examines the challenges and opportunities of labour migration for Europe and the European social model in the 21st century. The social incorporation and labour market insertion of labour migrants in Germany is considered in a comparative perspective which highlights the increasing importance of transnational migration and transnational social spaces as a feature of migration in Europe. It is transmigration, it is argued, that could constitute one crucial ingredient of the ‘cement’ for a sustainable social Europe.

Sommaire
Cet article examine les défis et les opportunités de l'immigration de travailleurs pour l'Europe et le modèle social européen au 21e siècle. L'intégration sociale et l'insertion sur le marché du travail des immigrants en Allemagne sont examinées dans une perspective soulignant l'importance croissante de l'immigration transnationale et des espaces sociaux transnationaux comme caractéristiques de l'immigration en Europe. Il montre que c'est la transmigration qui pourrait constituer une des composantes fondamentales d'une Europe sociale durable.

Zusammenfassung

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Introduction

Global economic stagnation, the Iraq War and SARS revealed the limits of a modest and self-oriented European project. People and powers inside and outside the European Union (EU) have presumed to design or delimit an ‘Old Europe’ and a ‘New Europe’. Europe stands at a historical divide and will turn towards a New Europe during the next decades. But what will be the contours of this New Europe at the mid-point of the 21st century? Will the EU constitute an economically, politically and socially unified supranational state and society which has more features in common internally than do each of its single units (states or regions) with other non-European units (states or regions) externally? Or will it be just a more or less loosely held together ‘Europe of the regions’, where the principle of shifting short-term rational coalitions of some countries against others prevails? Will the EU stand for a sustainable sociocultural, economic and political model which is of interest and attractive for other regions of the world? Or will it be perceived simply as a geographical part of the world with shifting internal alliances, pacts and conflicts?

Migration, and especially labour migration, is one decisive field where the profile of this New Europe will be forged. The argument developed here is that the possibility of the coming about of a socially, culturally, politically and economically attractive and sustainable European model depends on national and supranational settings and policies, as well as on real transnational networking and coming together of people and organisations. Trade unions, as national and perhaps also increasingly supranational organisations, could benefit greatly from transnational migrants and migration. In order to discuss the challenges and opportunities of labour migration for the EU, the history of divergence and convergence within the EU has to be examined. With regard to labour migration there are some common questions and challenges for the EU; at the same time, different Member States are affected distinctively (part 1 of this article). With respect to the social incorporation of labour migrants, three sets of the historical embedding of labour migration can be distinguished, with corresponding variations of incorporation traditions (part 2). A closer look at the German case underlines the relationship between incorporation policies and migrants’ insertion in the labour market (part 3). Finally, transnational migration could be viewed as an increasingly important issue and the ‘cement’ for a sustainable and social Europeanisation (part 4).

Common challenges of labour migration in the New Europe

Recent events have been a reminder that the notion of European unity is one thing and the reality of tangible power relations and interest coalitions based on divergent national traditions and experiences is another. What is the role of labour migration in the European project? A first topic to be dealt with at national and European level is the

1 I am grateful to Dorothea Goebel for her critical reading and helpful comments.
openness or closure to labour migration and the selectiveness involved in labour migration. The question to be asked is whether the individual Member States and the EU should be considered as ‘fortresses’ or as ‘open societies’ and whether economic globalisation should be supplemented by ‘workers without frontiers’ (Stalker 2000). Despite the existing divergences with respect to this question the EU principle of the free movement of capital, goods, and people and the Maastricht-Tampere-process up to the Communication of the European Commission of 22 November 2000 define a common ground and pressure for convergence for all Member States. (The United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families of 18 December 1990 and subsequent decisions such as the Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1998/15 also encourage adaptation towards an EU minimum level.)

This ‘political convergence factor’ is strongly related to a second topic, that is, the demographic factor, which is a challenge for a significant number of European countries. In its 2000 Communication the European Commission argued that the immigration ‘stop’ policy of the last 30 years was not adequate for the new demographic reality in Europe. In many countries the discourse on migration and immigration shifted fundamentally because it was related to problems of low fertility and ageing societies (for the cases of Germany, France and Britain, see Teitelbaum and Winter 1998). Even if not all European countries are faced with a demographic challenge to the same extent (Germany and Italy are more affected than France or United Kingdom), the situation in the vast majority of European countries has much in common by comparison with that of Northern or South America, Asia or Africa. This provides a tangible basis for defining common (labour) migration policies.

A third field of pressure for the convergence of Member States’ policies is the importance of defining at least minimum guidelines for a common ‘politics of belonging’ at a EU level. As will be shown in the following section, European countries have very different traditions of incorporation policies. These national traditions are deeply rooted in national history, structures and institutions. They therefore cannot change rapidly. There will nevertheless be a demand for adaptation of migrant categories and treatment in the EU. Owing to the free movement of EU citizens, this holds in particular for labour migrants. Until now there has been no common definition and ascription politics of such categories as citizen, immigrant, migrant or ‘foreigner’ at the EU level, not even for official statistical purposes.

The desire to manage at EU level the changing flows of migrants is a fourth factor obliging EU Member States to harmonise migration policies and to define common immigration control politics (pre- and post-entry and quota politics, etc.). During the last decade or so almost all the traditional ‘exporters’ of labour migrants such as Italy, Spain or Portugal have become immigration magnets for (legal and undocumented) labour seekers from North Africa and the Balkans (Stalker 2000: 14ff). With EU enlargement the eastern frontier of the EU migration system shifts from Germany to Poland, and Poland has to manage the (seasonal, transnational and definitive) labour migration of
Polish people to the West as well as immigration and passage migration pressure from the East (Ukraine, Belarus, Russia; see Tonnelli, in this issue). Independently of specific national traditions and priorities there are strong reasons for defining at EU level at least minimum principles of a migration policy and the treatment of internal as well as external labour migrants. Polish seasonal workers are now competing with and replacing Moroccans in Spanish and Portuguese agricultural work. Poland is therefore interested in what happens in the south-western boarder of the EU. Conversely, Polish immigration politics and the actual control of its eastern border are important for Austria, Germany and even the United Kingdom.

The last argument leads back to the more basic aspect of the issue. In spite of the fact that most EU Member States have different histories of labour migration (as countries of immigration, ‘guest workers’ or labour emigration), there is a substantial common need for mutual transparency of policies and politics, for a minimum level of coherence and convergence of labour migration principles and, ultimately, for harmonisation and integration of national and supranational programmes. Owing to the overall project of the EU as an economic, political and social endeavour and based on the principle of free movement of labour, national diversity with regard to migration reinforces the need for convergence efforts at least at a minimum level. This challenge does not exist because of a ‘threatening wave of mass migration with EU enlargement’ but because of the very nature of the EU as a political and social project at the beginning of the 21st century.

As concerns European labour migration, the second half of the 20th century was dominated first by bi-national agreements (‘guest worker’ regulations, etc.) and then by more long-term European transition regulations for new EU members. The first enlargement of the European Community during the 1980s (Greece, Spain and Portugal) did not lead to substantial waves of new mass migration towards, for instance, north-western highly industrialised countries. With reference to Portugal and Spain, a European Commission study concluded: ‘In any case, the effect of joining the EU in terms of migration flows has worked out differently in both countries. In other words, there is no uniform migration effect of joining the EU. Secondly, the increase in immigration was mainly observed in Germany and much less in other countries. Thirdly, part, but especially for Portugal, not all, of this increase is due to a substitution of migration from Switzerland to Germany’ (European Commission 1999: 71). In general terms, annual migration flows between EU countries are very low (about 0.1% of the corresponding population) as compared, for instance, with the United States, where five times more people move between the states within the US. Migration within the EU was higher in the first half of the 1990s than in the second, and, in most EU countries, immigration from non-EU countries was much more significant than that of other EU nationals (Eurostat 2002).

One general lesson of the above could be: the formal legal framework of international migration has an important but not decisive impact on actual migration flows. Creating legal migration facilities does not automatically lead to massive flows of people – even if tangible socio-economic differences would suggest this might be the case. And vice versa: wherever substantial socio-economic and welfare discrepancies and personal...
networks between different regions do exist, the formal legal regulation and unilateral migration policy of one country is very limited in controlling the actual flows of migrants. In the case of EU Member States possible effects of the liberty of migration are counterbalanced by regional development policies like the EU Cohesion Funds which focus on bringing work to where people are living and thereby avoiding the need for people to move to where they find work. Generally speaking, if one takes into consideration the prosperity lag, the information flow and the transport links that now exist between world regions, it is often more important to ask why so few people migrate from few states than to pose the question of why people migrate (see Faist 1997).

In the face of the current enlargement of the EU, massive new migration waves are not very likely (see the state of the art article of Fassmann and Münz 2003 and Morawska 2000). Based on the arguments and prognosis methods used in the case of the Mediterranean EU enlargement in the past the above conclusion could even apply to Turkey in the future. In summary, labour migration within and into the EU will certainly be an important issue in the future, but will not lead to massive waves of movements of people from the East and the South towards north-west Europe. Therefore, based on the actual numbers involved in international labour migration, massive migratory waves are unlikely. However, as politics do matter – at national and at EU level – there is a strong need to harmonise migration policies. Labour migration will be a decisive catalyst for further Europeanisation. In order to sketch the future of European labour migration and integration it is necessary to take into account the very diversity of the European countries themselves.

Diversity and convergence tendencies in the EU

In order to capture this European diversity we propose to distinguish five dimensions (see Table 1). The first dimension relates to whether or not there has been a relevant colonial tradition. Owing to the existence of the Spanish colonial Empire during more than three centuries there still exist important nexi in language and culture, special family ties and networks, longstanding economic relations and structures of production and commerce, and even special legal migration and citizenship regulations between Spain and many Latin American countries. An Ecuadorian labour migrant has more legal rights to enter, remain and work in Spain than he or she has, for instance, in Germany or France. A similar situation holds for the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth countries, between France and Algeria, Portugal and Angola, and the Netherlands and Spain with Indonesia and the Philippines respectively. Germany no longer has a colonial tradition, but migration trends and traditions have been forged by two World Wars, the forced labour of millions during the Nazi regime and the mass migration of tens of millions after World War II. Austria had no explicit colonial period but strong economic, political and personal ties to Hungary and the Balkans. The Scandinavian countries have very few colonial traditions. To understand and manage European labour migration policies and politics in the 21st century these national colonial traditions have to be taken into account.
The second dimension refers to the character of migration flows. During the second half of the 20th century, almost all European countries were exporters and importers of labour migrants. The timing and the volume of these flows have an effect on the current situation at the beginning of the 21st century. Germany was the most important exporter of migrants to the US at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. But this historical episode has not influenced current European migration trends as much as has the integration of Polish labour migrants into German society during the same period. As a result of Polish migration to Germany, for instance to the Ruhrgebiet zone in present-day North Rhine-Westphalia, and of German migration towards eastern countries (like the ‘Wolga-Germans’) there have up until now been strong transnational social ties triggering labour migration dynamics. During the second half of the 20th century, the Mediterranean EU countries of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal were mainly exporters of labour migrants, but over the last ten years or so they have been becoming important
importers of labour migrants from outside the EU (and sometimes also importers of retirees from within the EU; see Lurbe i Puerto, Samper and Alcade, in this issue).

A third dimension is related to the current relative and absolute weight of migrants within the labour force of each EU country. As Figure 1 shows, only a few EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg) employ relatively high shares of both EU and non-EU citizens (more than 7% of the total labour force). In only three countries are the foreigners employed predominantly EU citizens (Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg), but the vast majority of countries employ relatively more non-EU labour. The absolute numbers of immigrants and emigrants also vary dramatically. The overall net migration rate per 1 000 inhabitants was 11.4 for Ireland and 12.9 for Luxembourg in 2000, but only 0.4 for Germany, 2.8 for Italy and 3.5 for the United Kingdom. But owing to the differences in the population of each country these migration rates represent very different absolute numbers. The share of 11.4 immigrants per 1 000 inhabitants in the case of Ireland indicates a total number of about 20 000 immigrants in 2000, whereas the 0.4 immigrants per 1 000 inhabitants for Germany represent a total of 105 300 immigrants in 2000. In sum, absolute and relative weights and the flows of labour migrants into and within the EU vary significantly according to the specific situation and history of each country; any migration policy will affect the different EU countries in a different manner.

Another, fourth, dimension to take into account is the general philosophy related to migrants’ incorporation (as the general way they are related with their regions of origin and of arrival) and the ‘politics of belonging’ (Westwood and Phizacklea 2000). Simplifying two extremes, the United Kingdom stands for an approach that views society as a complex framework of different cultural and ethnic communities. Social integration and incorporation works by (liberal) means of recognition of diversity. At the other extreme, France represents the idea of citizenship and incorporation based on a republican tradition of liberté, égalité, solidarité ‘that predominates over ethnic differences (European Commission 2001). In the case of Germany, the dominant public approach to incorporation was traditionally based on a ius sanguinis principle of citizenship and on neglecting the very fact that Germany was and remains a country of immigration (Schiffauer et al. 2002; Brüggemann and Riehle, in this issue). The basic line of the ‘guest worker’ philosophy towards labour migration led to a ‘mutual blockade of integration’: for a long time the majority in the receiving society was not worried about the fact that millions of formal ‘foreigners’ were being born and brought up in Germany, and many of these second generation ‘foreigners’ felt and perceived themselves neither as Germans nor as foreigners, but as something ‘in between’.

This leads directly to the fifth and final dimension of European diversity in relation to labour migration, namely, the economic, cultural, political and social positioning and segmentation of labour migrants. One can distinguish two opposing ideal-types: on the one hand, explicit and tangible divergences between migrants and non-migrants and, on the other hand, relative homogeneity of positioning without segmentation by migrant group (which does not mean e.g. the absence of labour market segmentation but rather
that ethnic belonging is not a significant driving force of segmentation). It is difficult to limit these incorporation aspects to, for instance, static wage levels or job attainment criteria. As underlined by comparative studies (Constant and Massey 2000; European Commission 2001; Fassmann and Münz 2003) the dominant countries of origin of immigrants and also the prevailing social backgrounds vary from one country to another and in time (and always according to the above-mentioned historical traditions). For instance, Turkish migration to Germany mainly involved migrants with agricultural backgrounds and relatively few years of formal education who were integrated into manual industrial jobs. Comparing the employment rates of these migrants with those of German and French migrants in Luxembourg or with Asian immigrants in the US would be misleading without controlling for many intervening variables such as education, period of entry as labour migrant, and branch and position when first entering employment (in country of origin and as migrant). Some aspects of this complex picture are sketched out below for the case of Germany.

The ambivalence of migrants’ labour market insertion in Germany\(^2\)

As regards the four dimensions of the economic, social, cultural and political incorporation of labour migrants, research in Germany during the last two decades offers an interesting and often contradictory picture. Three aspects of incorporation will be considered briefly below: economic, educational and sociocultural. These three aspects each constitute decisive realms, and it would be difficult to discuss labour market incorporation without also mentioning these other dimensions.

Migrants’ economic incorporation

For basic labour market information on migrants the most representative data studies are drawn from the panel surveys of all formally salaried workers and employees (IAB-panel) and from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP-DIW). Basing their research on both these sources Bender and Seifert (1996) found no systematic segmentation of the German labour market by genuine ethnic or migrants’ categories. They did find significant variations between levels of income for Germans and for migrants. But they attributed these differences to individual assets relevant to the labour market and, based on this, to the typical labour market positions and careers of migrants. In short, labour migrants in Germany often have a rural background and/or little education. They therefore work in ‘lower’ labour market positions and earn less than Germans (see Kalter and Granato 2001; the Zuwanderungs-Report 2001 integrates some of the data presented here). For 1966 Herbert (1986: 198) indicates a rate of 90% of all male migrant workers as unskilled compared with 49% of the German male population;

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\(^2\) This section gained from literature studies of Dorothea Goebel and Volker Hamann which are acknowledged with gratitude.
12 years later, in 1978, almost 81% of all migrant workers were employed as unskilled and manual workers. When controlling for mechanisms contributing to segmentation, education levels and the system of dual apprenticeship play a more important role than does the characteristic of being a migrant. Where and when – according, for example, to sectors of manual work – second generation migrants make up a similar or equal share of qualified workers (with the Facharbeiter or apprenticeship certificate) the income differences between Germans and migrants virtually disappear.

With regard to changes in income differences over time several scholars indicate an increasing gap between Germans and migrant workers during the last two decades (see Seifert 1995, and Kalter and Granato 2001 who found widening income differences between Yugoslavs, Italians and Turks, and Germans between 1989 and 1996). This increasing polarisation between native and ‘foreign’ labour market participants is mainly a reflection of the unfavourable sectors where migrants traditionally work. The old industrial sectors with manual and often semi-qualified work (such as mining and steel or the automobile industry) went through a difficult restructuring process where migrants were significantly disadvantaged – not for being migrants as such but for working predominantly in these sectors and for lacking educational and qualification levels which would have facilitated their mobility and flexibility.

Despite these problems, analysis of the intergenerational mobility of labour migrants Seifert (2000) found considerable improvements for second generation migrants. Mehrländer et al. (1995) and Schultze (1995) found that first generation unskilled labourers’ children move up to more qualified – but still manual – labour positions. A move from blue-collar to white-collar jobs is still quite rare. Kalter and Granato (2001) confirm these findings: in relation to the employment positions and income of Germans and ‘foreigners’ they found that the industrial sectors have undergone a steady de-segmentation of the labour force from 1970 to 1996.

Some basic features of labour migrants’ economic incorporation in Germany – as compared with other countries – could be summarised as follows. From the 1950s to the 1980s ‘guest workers’ from predominantly rural backgrounds and with low educational levels entered into un- or semi-qualified manual industrial employment. Their children moved up to positions requiring qualifications, mainly when they passed the apprenticeship system, but stayed in manual industrial positions (whereas female second generation workers mostly went into low-profile service sector jobs). By comparison with other European and non-European countries German labour migration differs for at least three reasons. First, the industrial sector traditionally included more than half of the total workforce, and during that time migrants were almost exclusively recruited for industrial work (in other countries such as the US or Spain migrants were also or even mainly employed in agrarian or service activities). Secondly, the German apprenticeship system marked and still defines a clear segmentation line for income and working conditions which hinders migrants without the Facharbeiter certificate from moving upwards to qualified work. When children of first generation migrants pass the dual apprenticeship their labour market prospects do not differ significantly because of
ethnic or residential status. Thirdly, and related to the above, the German ‘guest worker’ policy and politics and the predominant citizenship approach of *ius sanguinis* and of ‘Germany is no immigration country’ defined the dynamics of migrants’ incorporation during the whole of the 20th century in the sense of a *downwards spiral*: the state and mainstream society in Germany did not want to admit the multicultural immigration situation as a long-term matter of fact, and the majority of migrants did not define themselves as immigrants or as return migrants but remained undecided, as something in-between.

During the 1990s the implosion of ‘real socialism’ and the Balkan wars led to considerable waves of immigration of ethnic Germans (*Spätaussiedler*) and to the arrival of asylum-seekers mainly from the former Yugoslavia. But this did not change the above-mentioned basic characteristics which continue to pose fundamental challenges in terms of economic incorporation. For instance, once a migrant household enters into poverty, the duration of this period will be significantly longer than that of a German household. With poverty being defined as 50-60% below the median income of the overall population, 15% of German children live in households that suffer from poverty compared with 24% of children of ‘foreigners’ whose households experience poverty (Frick and Wagner 2001). Whereas ‘foreigners’ represent almost a tenth of all the employed their unemployment rate is more than double that of German natives (16.5% and 7.4% in 2001). As pointed out above, migrants’ economic disadvantages are not directly correlated to ethnic discrimination but to the very personal, historical and structural characteristics of migrants’ employment. And this economic integration is directly related to their socio-cultural incorporation.

**Migrants’ educational incorporation**

Some scholars argue that sociocultural integration, mainly language skills and educational achievement, are basic preconditions for economic or ‘structural’ integration (Esser 2000). One could also argue the other way round: economic integration facilitates language learning and skills upgrading. Educational attainment, for instance, is correlated with marriage and sexual reproduction as well as position within the labour market (Kalter and Granato 2001: 11). Given the complex and dynamic interrelations between the different dimensions of incorporation some debates appear as a chicken-and-egg-problem. But the dynamics of economic and educational incorporation are interrelated, and Germany features at least three particularities in this regard. First, incorporation and segregation begin at pre-school age; in Germany only about one-quarter of all migrants’ children attend a *Kindergarten* (Esser 2000: 50). Whereas in other countries, such as France, a public and laicistic pre-school system begins compensating for language and basic value differences at the age of three or four, in Germany many migrant children experience their first intensive contact with the majority groups of Germany’s population at the age of six or seven when entering primary school (Hettlage 1999). The alarming results of the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) Survey have to be explained in part with this factor in mind. The lack of language acquisition (both native and German) and the domination of German as the
public language is the major outcome of these pre- and primary school disadvantages of children from migrant households (Weidacher 2000; European Commission 2001).

A second particularity of the German education system is its internal segmentation into three different pillars (*Hauptschule*, *Realschule*, *Gymnasium*) starting at the very early age of ten years; the barriers to changing to a higher school type afterwards are quite high. This system cements and accentuates language and other relevant skills deficits of children with a migrant background – who remain mainly at the lower level of *Hauptschule* where the majority of pupils often come from migrant households. Riphahn (2001) and Hunger and Tränhardt (2001) state that the educational levels of second generation migrants are significantly below those of Germans of the same age. Whether or not the educational disadvantages of migrants’ children do diminish over time is still an open question. In 1970 only 3.7% of all Germans had completed a higher level of secondary education; in 1996 the share rose to 14.9%, almost a fourfold increase on the figure for 1970. At the same time, migrants’ participation in secondary education rose only from 1.8% to 5.5% (Kalter and Granato 2001: 19). Based on the GSOEP data, Frick and Wagner (2001: 309) found that after the parents have lived for a period of 20 years in Germany, their children have equal opportunities to their native counterparts in the type of school they can attend.

A third and already mentioned characteristic of the German education-employment intersection is the vocational training system. As good training opportunities in the dual apprenticeship system depend on school qualifications, the disadvantages of migrant households’ children accumulated since pre-school time become even more acute. Bender and Seifert (1996) found that only half of all ‘foreigners’ aged 20 to 30 have acquired a diploma from (vocational or academic) training (whereas more than three-quarters of Germans hold such a diploma). Seifert (2000) notes that 29% of all migrants leave the education system without any valid diploma. With regard to the attendance of *Gymnasium* (the school type that gives access to university) Frick and Wagner (2001) note that only one out of five children born to migrants compared with one-third of native Germans and a quarter of children born to migrants with German citizenship attend this school type.

The above-mentioned particularities of the educational incorporation of migrants in Germany in the context of overall incorporation concepts and mechanisms are reflected in comparative research findings. In the above-mentioned study commissioned by the European Commission (European Commission 2001) the dynamics and patterns of integration among children of international migrants (CIM) in France, Great Britain and Germany are analysed. The term integration is subdivided into structural, cultural, social, and identificational integration, and the research seeks to control for individual and institutional factors explaining the outcome of the dynamics of migrants’ integration. The study states that the ‘national context systematically explains much more variance than individual variables’ (p. 16). Whereas France is characterised by a universalistic and republican ‘assimilation approach’ of incorporation with relatively strong cultural and quite problematic training and employment results, the United Kingdom
combines an incorporation mode of recognising and promoting multi-ethnic and multi-cultural community building with a high degree of identification by migrants with Great Britain and, at the same time, ethnically accentuated segmentation of training and employment. ‘Germany has comparative strengths in training and employment of CIM, but weaknesses in legal and identificational integration. An ambiguous policy seems to have produced ambiguous results’ (p. 16ff).

Based on ethnographical case studies in Berlin, London, Paris and Rotterdam, Schiffauer et al. (2002) study the process of the political incorporation of migrants as mediated by the educational system. They underline the specific function of schools in the different societies, and the ideas and concepts that school conveys to students about their society. In this context, the French and the British cases are presented as two ideal types of incorporation approaches: France with the idea of a homogenous republican nation and Great Britain with a liberal concept of a multi-ethnic, community-based society. Concerning incorporation concepts and outcomes Germany and the Netherlands lie in between the aforementioned countries. One crucial conclusion of these European comparative incorporation studies is that there is neither a one best way nor a convergence towards a unique European model of incorporation. If national models of migrants’ incorporation are still at work and will persist, where should supranational or transnational identities and incorporation come from? Is there any chance for a Europeanisation? These questions relate to the sociocultural dimension of incorporation.

(Trans-) national identity and sociocultural incorporation

Economic and educational incorporation schemes are strongly interlinked with sociocultural aspects and modes of belonging of the receiving society as well as that of the migrants themselves. A first element here refers to the social relations migrants have with members of the receiving society. In the comparative European Report more than half of surveyed Turkish young people in Germany (n=287) indicated at least one friend belonging to a different ethnic group (European Commission 2001: 61). Contrary to this finding, and based on more representative German data, Seifert (1998) found three-quarters of all surveyed Turkish immigrants in 1994 having no German friends (see also Shell Study 2000).

In addition to school and work, membership of a club or association is a good way of interrelating with others and finding friends. The European Commission Report (2001: 63) states that two-thirds of all migrants who responded are not affiliated to any clubs or associations. According to research by the German Youth Institute on migrants’ membership of ethnic associations, some six out of ten of surveyed male Turkish immigrants and three-quarters of surveyed female immigrants are not members of any ethnic association. Nevertheless, the study found that migrant youth is more frequently organised in clubs and associations than German youth (Weidacher 2000: 214-221). However, taking into account the fact that most of these aggregations are ethnically exclusive or segmented, the higher organisation rate of migrant youth is rather an indicator for sociocultural separation than for integration.
An important measure for the level of migrants’ incorporation in the receiving country is the subjective and declared desire or intention to return to the country of origin or to remain definitively in the host country. Generally speaking, this topic of return migration constitutes a dominant theme in everyday discourse, especially that of Turkish migrants (Zaglar 1989: 7-9). Wolbert (1997: 58) analyses return as a key symbol: it works as a joker that is played at least mentally when migrants are being confronted with experiences of exclusion. Hettlage (1999: 162ff) found that 60% of surveyed migrants were satisfied living in Germany, but only 25% felt rooted in German society. Sackmann et al. (2000) note that 47% of all migrants wish to stay in Germany, 20% are undecided, 17% want to return and 17% prefer to commute between Germany and the country of origin. Frick and Wagner (2001: 306) note that every second foreign household reports subjective feelings of being discriminated against. Seifert (1998) analyses migrants’ subjective self-positioning and notes that half of them wish to stay in Germany, but lack a sense of ‘being German’. These results are interesting, as they convey the limits of possible incorporation, they largely reflect the restrictive integration and naturalisation policy in Germany, and they indicate a considerable identificatorian space for transnational strategies of belonging. In sum, migrants in Germany are more or less satisfied with their way of living, but they neither feel themselves to be part of an overall integrating national project (as, for instance, in the case of France) nor do they perceive themselves as being integrated in an ethnic community as a recognised part of a multicultural society project (as, for instance, in the case of Great Britain).

It is perhaps just because of these ambiguous experiences and feelings of belonging that the field lies open for transnational identity and incorporation strategies. Whereas identities normally are conceived to rely on a binary classification scheme (‘the self’ and ‘the other’), transnationalism entails a multi-faceted contradictory belonging. As one of the first scholars studying new transnational phenomena Kearney and Nagengast (1989) pointed to new identity formations in pluri-local and not uni-directional transnational migration. Kearney (1995: 558) defines transnational belonging as more than only the combination of sociocultural elements of the countries of origin and of arrival. Transnational belonging refers to a ‘both-and-and’, ‘in which the subject shares partial, overlapping identities, with other similarly constituted decentred subjects that inhibit reticular social forms’.

Taking transnational social spaces as an important emerging feature of Europe in the 21st century (Pries 2003) the focus on incorporation strategies and outcomes has to shift from the question ‘to what extent migrants’ incorporation into a national container society should or can be successful?’ to the interrogative ‘what different types of national and of transnational incorporation exist in the present and could emerge in the future?’ This leads directly to the final question of transnational migration and migrants as a possible ferment or ‘cement’ of European social integration. The basic hypothesis is that transnational migration, as an increasingly important feature in international migration dynamics, could develop as a material foundation and social network basis for European integration and for Europe’s worldwide integration.
Transnational migration as the ‘cement’ of social Europeanisation?

The main point to be made here is to introduce transnational migration as an increasingly important factor in the analysis of the movement of people in the New Europe. Transnational migration differs from immigration or return-migration as singular country shifts. It differs also from the ‘Diaspora-migration’ of political refugees, diplomatic corps or managerial expatriates for whom their home country or ‘promised land’ remains the dominant point of reference during their time-limited stays ‘abroad’. Transnational migration consists of frequent border shifting for more than seasonal reasons and spans individuals’ and households’ lives and strategies of belonging between places in different countries. Ethnic identity and sociocultural self-awareness is characterised by ambiguity and multiple frames of reference, and life strategies are based on pluri-local landscapes of transnational social spaces.

Transnational migration is quite well documented for North America (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Basch et al. 1997; Pries et al. 1998). But is it an important issue for Europe and especially for the current EU enlargement process? In addition to the evidence for the Mediterranean region (Wihtol de Wenden 1993; Hillmann 2000) there are many signs of transnational migration and of the emergence of transnational social spaces for eastern Europe. Miera 2001, Korczynska 2001 and Cyrus 2001 describe and analyse Polish migration to Berlin and identify transnational socio-economic spaces in which a part of the Polish people live in between Berlin and places in Poland: there exists an informal labour market with its own rules and mechanisms, an infrastructure of clubs, newspapers and other cultural goods that is neither simply Polish nor simply of or for Polish immigrants, but part of the boundary spanning the everyday-life practices and identities of transmigrants.

Even for – at least some of the – ‘ethnic Germans’ coming from Poland (Spätaussiedler), who are supposed to assimilate quite quickly in Germany, Pallaske (2001) notes ambiguous identification processes: ‘Especially at the beginning of their stay they deny the identity of their country of origin, become confused about their identity and try to get rid of all old roots. When they become aware that this strategy is not successful, many of the Aussiedler recall their Polish identity. Young Aussiedler identify themselves less and less as Germans’ (2001: 136; the term Aussiedler was kept in the German original). Morawska 1998 argues that transnational social life was not a new phenomenon of the 1990s but has existed for more than a hundred years. In the case of the (decomposition of the) former USSR, Oswald and Voronkov (1997) studied the renaissance of a stronger ethnic ascription and awareness of people; based on the former Soviet policy of a double nationality (general citizenship of the USSR and ethnic self-ascription to a certain ‘national people group’) many people rediscover ethnicity as a manageable resource and develop multi-sited and ambiguous (somewhat transnational) identities and life practices. Kalaceva and Karpenko (1997) analysed the shifting policies of (in part transnational) belonging for Jewish Russians or Russian Jewish in St. Petersburg. In short, there are many indications that transnationalism and transnational migration is an important issue for eastern Europe today.
Based on these general considerations on transnational migration it could be argued that EU consolidation and enlargement will lead to a sustainable New Europe only if the European project is ‘realised’ (in the double sense of perceived and set up) not simply as a multi-national and/or a supranational endeavour at state or corporate level but also as a transnational growing together of social networks and everyday life. International and especially transnational migration will play a crucial part in this. International migration flows are probably not just a passing exception for some years or decades. On the contrary, the idea of a relatively ‘sedentary’ life for most people in stable ‘national container societies’ was probably the historical exception over the past two centuries. The vision of living in a more or less fixed social space (the fixed boundaries of a nation state) (and consequently of international migration as a momentary evening out for transition and transformation frictions) was historically unique – it was the outcome of the Old Europe based on the Treaty of Westphalia which was agreed more than 350 years ago.

This Old Europe has a deeply rooted political and cultural heritage stretching from Ireland to Romania, and it will not simply disappear. Meanwhile, the predominant role of nationalism and nation states originated historically in Europe. During the last hundred years or so this ‘Old European nation-state’ pattern spread all over the world as the concept of ‘national container societies’ in the sense of the reciprocal exclusiveness of social spaces to more or less clearly definable and known geographic spheres. Globalisation and other types of internationalisation such as transnationalism are changing and challenging this ‘nation state as a container concept’. This does not imply the neglect of the role of nations and states and of geographic-territorial policies of belonging. National traditions and settings for constructing national identities and involving migrants in this construction – as mentioned above for the British, French and German cases – will not dissolve in a homogeneous globalised world. The Iraq War strengthened or at least revealed national tensions between European countries according to different historical roots, national identities and politics.

Meanwhile, as the 21st century experiences the ongoing forces of globalisation and of nationalism, it is also giving birth to increasingly transnational networks of people and social spaces. The traditional models of identity and belonging (the religious or civilising one and the national ones) are not being melted in a global world society nor are they being dissolved in a post-modern immaterial ‘space of flows’ (Castells 1996) or being diluted in supranational units such as the European Union. National, global, supranational and transnational coming together of people and durable networks of economic, cultural, political and social practices, symbols and artefacts are not replacing each other but are differentiated and complementary means of socialisation.

Whereas the national, multi-national, supranational and global levels are the genuine fields of action for corporate and state actors (such as profit- and non-profit-organisations, states, the European Commission or the United Nations) the transnational arena refers mainly to organisations and personal networks. Transnational migration or transmigration as a concept allows us to differentiate the understanding of the patterns of
migrants’ simultaneous integration into several places and societies, for instance their ‘host society’ and their ‘home society’. By these means, immigrants (like most of the Spätaussiedler in Germany) typically incorporate themselves into the economy, the social and political system and also into the culture (which could be more or less homogenous and diversified) of the host society – even if this process is slow and spans two or three generations.

Conversely, ideal typical return migrants (like ‘guest workers’), after a period of working and living ‘abroad’, go back to their home country reincorporating themselves in all dimensions (even if this will probably be quite difficult). Diaspora-migrants (such as diplomatic employees or managers in international companies) incorporate themselves into the host country mainly at a local level in some dimensions (such as the economic or political activities they were sent to the country for), but they maintain their basic real and imagined life and biographical centre in their home country, especially their cultural and social networks (but also economic ties, for instance the legal employment relation and a house). Finally, transmigrants ideal-typically maintain ties and network relations in all four dimensions of incorporation as well as in the local and national levels of the host and home countries. They not only move physically ‘transnationally’ between places but their biographical orientations and projects span different places and countries.

Distinguishing these four types of migrants and corresponding integration patterns leads to a more appropriate understanding of the dynamics of incorporation (this term seems more neutral and less value loaded than those of assimilation, adaptation or integration). Incorporation first of all is an open-ended process as far as its result and its further development are concerned. Current social conflicts in the Balkans and in eastern Europe show that the dynamics of social-ethnic inclusion and exclusion constitute a social process which remains fragile over several generations and has the potential to deteriorate. Incorporation, secondly, is a complex and dialectical social process of self perception and perception by others among different groups. It requires the successful interaction of those to be incorporated with the rest of the society. If the interaction is being blocked by only one of the interacting sides, then incorporation is minimal, or is not taking place at all (see the incorporation features of Turkish migrants in Germany who were perceived and perceived themselves as ‘guest workers’).

Thirdly, incorporation is a multi-dimensional process with an economic, a political, a social and a cultural dimension. There exist a variety of patterns and outcomes related to the intensity and sequences of incorporation in these distinctive dimensions. As well as the fact that immigrants may belong to a variety of different reference groups, their incorporation is also taking place at different spatial scales simultaneously. Therefore incorporation cannot be characterised sufficiently as a uni-spatial process; it is necessary to differentiate a local, national and transnational scale, interrelated to each other and mutually interacting. Because of these interrelations, processes on one scale can promote or inhibit incorporation on the other spatial scales. Meanwhile, whereas traditional integration is centered on one place or one system, incorporation can be pluri-local and transnational.
Transnational migration leads to multi-sited and multi-faceted modes of living and belonging. Transnational migrants do not ‘fall in between’ the states and societies of origin and of arrival, but they span new social, political, cultural and economic ties above and between them. Labour migration has not mainly been and will not primarily be a dangerous threat for Europe, but a challenge and opportunity to weave the texture and create the ferment for a New Europe – a Europe not only of states and regions, but of people and the shared diversity and multiplicity of belongings. The above-mentioned diversity of European countries in relation to migration history, policy and politics, as well as the dynamics of incorporation, will not and cannot be extinguished in a completely homogenised synthetic New Europe. On the contrary, the ineradicable diversity of European national traditions will trickle down into multi-ethnic and multicultural social spaces within transnational ties and networks. For unions and other corporate organisations, transnational migration is a challenge and an opportunity: even if in absolute numbers migrants are not always very significant, migrants and especially transnational migrants could serve as an important enzyme for developing not only multi-national and supranational, but also transnational ties and politics.

References


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